Toward a Greener Peace? Nuclear Reprocessing, Security, and International Cooperation in East Asia

Stephanie Tai, Andrew Loewenstein Todd Bissett, and Eric O'Malley 

Abstract

　

        In Chapter 11 Stephanie Tai, Andrew Loewenstein, Todd Bissett and Eric O'Malley look at concerns about Chinese and South Korean nuclear programs, and particularly the waste that they will increasingly create. One of the universally recognized problems with nuclear power is its generation of dangerous wastes. For states that desire to increase their use of nuclear power, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels is often viewed as a positive alternative to storing them, which poses both significant costs and health risks. However, the reprocessing option comes with its own problems: the materials generated through reprocessing can be directly used in nuclear explosives, and accidents can occur during the transport of spent nuclear fuels from nuclear power plants to reprocessing facilities. Despite these dangers, South Korea and China are considering the option of nuclear reprocessing as a means of generating power while simultaneously reducing their already-increasing nuclear waste stockpiles and reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. China's pilot reprocessing facility will be completed soon. This raises important issues of trade in wastes in the region, notably between South Korea and China, and it is likely that the choices of South Korea and China with respect to reprocessing will have substantial influence on East Asia's nuclear energy choices. Both states already have well-established nuclear energy programs, and an increasing number of Asian states that do not are exploring the use of nuclear power. As this process gathers momentum, it will have important implications for security in East Asia because the countries in the region must try to reconcile and balance the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation associated with reprocessing, the pressing need to meet rising energy demands created by economic development, and the environmental impacts (both positive and negative) of nuclear power.

　

        What explains the calculations of South Korea and China in choosing to increase use of nuclear energy, despite the dangers posed by the accompanying waste? The authors have several explanations based on economic and environmental considerations. For example, from the perspective of East Asian policymakers, evidence of the ecological problems associated with nuclear energy generally, and reprocessing specifically, may be outweighed by countervailing arguments that a better environmental balance may be struck by reprocessing spent fuels to avoid storage concerns and by looking instead to the nuclear option to satisfy swelling energy demands, thereby decreasing their reliance on coal-based power (with its attendant greenhouse gas emissions). On the military side of the equation, states considering whether to engage in nuclear reprocessing and trade in reprocessed materials must evaluate the security risks of proliferation against the predicted economic and (admittedly debatable) environmental benefits. Policymakers recognize that the nuclear materials created by reprocessing can be used directly in nuclear explosives, and thus that the decision to engage in reprocessing carries with it obvious and significant military implications. However, these recognized proliferation risks have not dampened enthusiasm in East Asia for trading reprocessed materials.  This may be explained by the fact that whether proliferation is conceived as a threat to security is a matter of perception, and one that is not necessarily perceived uniformly.  Indeed, the risk of proliferation caused by trading reprocessed materials may be much more serious for those other than the immediate parties to the economic transaction, because those most susceptible to it are more likely to be, for example, the United States and its allies. Thus, fears that trading reprocessed materials could lead to new nuclear weapons threats are likely to prove ineffective in dissuading China and South Korea from engaging in the reprocessing and trading of nuclear materials.