Navigating between "Luxury" and "Survival" Emissions in China: Bilateral versus Multilateral Negotiations

　

Yuka Kobayashi

　

Abstract

　

In Chapter 5, Yuka Kobayashi examines tensions between "luxury" and "survival" emissions in China's climate change diplomacy. Luxury emissions are many or most of those in the developed world resulting from affluent lifestyles; survival emissions are those frequently essential to survival in the developing world. As Kobayashi points out, while there are many studies in international relations on environmental regime formation, compliance and effectiveness, there are relatively few that begin from China's perspective. China is particularly concerned about climate change because implementing the related international regime is expensive, imposing broad constraints on its economy. In addition to posing difficulties for many developing countries, climate change is a controversial issue that involves North-South equity considerations (as elaborated in Chapter 2). This is exacerbated by China's view of sustainable development as "sustained development," and the country's usual ranking of economic development and poverty alleviation above environmental protection. What is more, bearing in mind China's history, its view of the climate change regime is often one of "imperial invasion, yet again."

 

As a consequence of these and other considerations, in multilateral negotiations China has generally opposed mechanisms such as joint implementation and the CDM. However, in bilateral, project-level negotiations, China has shown more flexibility by approving several joint implementation projects. Why does China take these differing stances in these two types of negotiations? How does this alter our understanding of Chinese responses to climate change? According to Kobayashi, at the multilateral level China has joined the developing world in international negotiations to maintain its partnership with them, but at the bilateral level its domestic interests prevail. These policies are influenced by the relative power of influential ministries, and by China's desire to avoid losing control over joint implementation projects, which is more likely with multilateral programs. China took an accommodating stance on joint implementation projects in the bilateral relationship with Japan because doing so offered the best technology and gave China more control over the relationship. Kobayashi concludes that neorealist perspectives on international relations, which focus on the distribution of power among countries, help explain its multilateral stance, but that we should look at more detailed issues - such as relative power of bureaucratic and ministerial actors, or historical experiences - to fully explain many of China's climate change policies resulting from bilateral negotiations.