¡@
Climate Change as Japanese Foreign Policy: From Reactive to Proactive
¡@
¡@
Abstract
¡@
The third part of the book focuses on the shaping of Japan's climate change policies. Japan's role was highlighted when it hosted the 1997 Kyoto conference, which resulted in the Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC. Looking at the evolution of Japan's foreign policy on climate change over the last decade and a half, one can argue that it has moved from reacting to what other countries do to being much more proactive in trying to shape the climate change regime. As Yasuko Kameyama shows in Chapter 7, Japan was one of the last countries to enter the climate change debate, but now it continually submits proposals and stimulates international negotiation. However, behind Tokyo's new unified international face lie disparate views and motivations. Different actors in Japan have interpreted climate change policies in various ways; some have considered it an environmental problem, others an integral part of energy policies. The upshot is that climate change as foreign policy has been the most influential driving force in Japan's response to climate change. That is, being involved in an even trying to lead the climate change debate has in some respects become Japan's foreign policy, quite apart from global warming and climate change per se.
To explain this phenomenon, Kameyama divides Japan's response to the international climate change debate into five historical phases. The first phase went from 1985 to early 1989, when Japan was not interested in climate change. During this period, not many people in Japan were aware of the problem or recognized its political significance. The second phase lasted from late 1989 to May 1992, when climate change entered the political agenda and countries negotiated the FCCC. The third phase ran from 1992 to March 1995. There were no major events at the international level during this phase, but Japan's ratification of the FCCC allowed it to build a fundamental policy basis at home and influenced its foreign policy, especially at the regional level. The fourth phase went from the first conference of the parties to the FCCC (COP1) in March and April 1995, to COP3 in December 1997, when the parties to the FCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol. This phase included the process for negotiating the protocol. The fifth phase identified by Kameyama lasted from 1998 to 2001. During this phase Japan endeavored to influence the follow-up negotiations on implementing the Kyoto Protocol.
Kameyama argues that the interface between international negotiations and domestic policies is where a variety of positions of sub-national actors are consolidated into a country's single policy. She examines this interface by reference to "two-level game" analysis, which encompasses both international and domestic forces shaping policy. Kameyama finds that Japan's shift from a reactive to a proactive climate change policy was related to shifts in its foreign policy process. Hosting COP3 in Kyoto had a significant effect in involving foreign policy perspectives in the Japanese climate change debate. Before the start of negotiations toward the Kyoto Protocol, Japan tended to consider climate change as only an environmental or energy issue. During the negotiations, however, it began to see climate change as a foreign policy matter related to broader Japanese interests in international affairs. This change influenced Japan's position during and after the negotiation of the protocol. Kameyama argues that Japan's position on climate change will continue to be influenced by the foreign policy process. Its greater willingness to be involved in the global climate change debate is likely to continue if its involvement at the international level remains as it has been in recent years. The converse is plausible, however, if its role at the international level changes.
¡@