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Department of Economics

Seminar on "Does Aftermarket Monopolization Facilitate Upstream Collusion?"

Speaker Professor Ye Guangliang
Hanqing Advanced Institute of
Economics and Finance
Renmin University of China
Date 8 June 2017 (Thursday)
Time 11:00am – 12:15pm
Venue WYL314, Dorothy Y. L. Wong Building


This paper explores the stability of collusion among upstream firms selling to downstream retailers with an aftermarket. Consumer lock-in in this aftermarket has two effects. Firstly, it restricts the size of the aftermarket, which a deviating firm can capture from its rivals. Secondly, it limits the severity of punishments that act as a threat against deviation. We show that the second effect dominates the first one and thus collusion is less stable. Our results are robust when the downstream aftermarket is asymmetric, with a downstream firm selling a generic substitute. 


Professor Ye is a professor of Economics at the Hanqing Advanced Institute of Finance and Economics, Renmin University of China, and he is also Director of the Antitrust and Competition Policy Center, Renmin University of China. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. His recent research focuses on antitrust and competition policy, industrial organization and organizational strategy. In recent years, Professor Ye has written more than twenty scholarly articles, which have appeared in many publications including the Organization Science, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Review of Industrial Organization, Journal of Comparative Economics, Economic Inquiry, Regional Science and Urban Economics, Economics Letters, and Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.