Abstract
In the paper, I hypothesize more ratings can signal low risk levels for structured finance products. The signaling effect can be especially pronounced when an originator manages to obtain ratings derived from significantly different methodologies. It can also be pronounced in markets where securities feature more opaqueness and information asymmetry. To test the hypothesis, an econometric model is devised to overcome the potential endogeneity in originators' signaling decision. It is also discussed how the signaling hypothesis can be empirically distinguished against alternative explanations of multiple ratings.

Biography
Kebin is a PhD student in finance, Tilburg University. He obtained his research master degrees in both economics and finance from CentER graduate school. His research interests are industrial organization and microeconomics of banking. He is currently visiting Universitat Pompeu Fabra as a Marie Curie program early stage research fellow. His research in the program is mainly on banking competition and stability. He also works on credit ratings and on product liability law.

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