Abstract:
In a multi-candidate election, a voter may prefer to vote for his second choice in order to defeat his least favorite candidate. I study a model in which voters know their own preference but infer support of each candidate from a private signal. I show that if private signals are sufficiently precise, an equilibrium exists and is unique in the limit as the size of the electorate increases. In this unique equilibrium, voters behave more sincerely if they worry less about their worst choice winning. Using this property, I show that in sequential primaries, winning early primaries improves a candidate’s chance of winning later primaries. I show that sequential primaries alleviates coordination failure, but puts more weight on preference of the median voters in the early primaries. When voters worry enough about defeating their worst choice, sequential primaries are better at aggregating preferences than simultaneous primaries.

Biography:
Dr. Pei-yu Lo is an economist in game theory and political economy. She got her Ph.D from the department of economics at Yale University. She did a postdoc for a year at Brown University before joining The University of Hong Kong. Her research centers on communication games and voting games.

All Are Welcome