

# SEMINAR

## Blackwell Equilibrium

Co-authors: Cavounidis, Hörner, Solan, Takahashi

### By Prof. Sambuddha Ghosh

Associate Professor, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (SUFE)  
Visiting Scholar, CUHK

**Date: 3 February 2023 (Friday)**

**Time: 3:00pm – 4:30pm**

**Venue: WYL314, 3/F, Dorothy Y. L. Wong Building,  
Lingnan University**



#### ABSTRACT:

We study repeated interactions under Blackwell equilibrium, where strategies are best responses (sequentially rational) for all high enough discount factors simultaneously. Thus, our predictions survive misspecification of time preferences. The bite of this requirement depends on the monitoring structure. Under perfect monitoring, we just need to redefine the punishment (minmax) value. Under imperfect monitoring (without public randomisation), a Blackwell equilibrium generically involves pure-action profiles or stage-game Nash equilibria only. Under private conditionally independent monitoring, in a class of games that includes the prisoner's dilemma, the stage-game Nash equilibrium must be played in every round.

#### BIOGRAPHY:

Sambuddha (Som) Ghosh was born, raised, and educated in the city of Calcutta, now Kolkata, in West Bengal. He studied Economics Honours at Presidency College, an undergraduate institution known for nurturing both winners of the 'Economics Nobel' from India. After his Master's from the Indian Statistical Institute in Kolkata, he moved to the US, earning his PhD from Princeton University, supervised by Dilip Abreu (main) and Eric Maskin. Ghosh has been academically affiliated with Boston University, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, and Chinese University of Hong Kong; he is currently visiting the last named. His main research themes are formal political economy and game theory, with an emphasis on dynamic games.

**Welcome to join !**

**\*\*Registration is required\*\***

**Register Here:**

