




Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response *(in English)*

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Biography:

Professor Lim received his PhD in economics from University of Pittsburgh in 2010. He has been appointed as Assistant Professor in HKUST since 2011. He is also the Associate Director of the Centre for Experimental Business Research in HKUST. His main research areas are Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory and Experimental Economics.

Date: 27 March 2015 (Friday)
Time: 11 am - 12:30 pm
Venue: WYL314, Dorothy Y. L. Wong Building

Abstract:

This paper explores plausible deniability theoretically and experimentally in a communication game motivated by Warner's (1965) randomized response technique (RRT). It thus links game-theoretic approaches to noisy communication with survey practice in the field and a novel implementation in the lab. Consistent with equilibria of our game and in line with Warner, the frequency of truthful responses in the lab is significantly higher with randomization than without. Contrary to the intended use of RRT, however, there are equilibria that translate into lower and even invalid (negative) population estimates, and these are supported by both prior and our own experimental findings.