

## SEMINAR ON

# Killer Acquisitions and Divestiture Remedies

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### Abstract:

Killer acquisitions have recently received much attention from academics and antitrust authorities all over the world. Based on the model of Cunningham et al. (2021, JPE), we investigate the impact of “voluntarily divestiture” on the acquiring incumbent’s optimal acquisition strategies, as well as the impact of a structural remedy called “Commit-to-divestiture” on killer acquisition. We demonstrate that (1) when the degree of product similarity is high enough, the acquirer prefers to use the “voluntarily divestiture” option. (2) Making the “voluntarily divestiture” strategy available to the buyer reduces the killing zone while increasing total welfare. (3) In the presence of synergy effect, the “Commit-to-Divestiture” remedy is an effective merger control technique.

**Date: 17 March, 2022 (Thursday)**

**Time: 4:00PM-5:30PM**

**Venue: Online via Zoom**

- **Zoom link:** <https://lingnan.zoom.us/j/93114194380?pwd=T3I4WW9lKzhzY2tSby9mdUwzVzMzQT09>
- **Meeting ID:** 931 1419 4380
- **Passcode:** 70997344

**All are welcome!!**



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Zoom meeting:**