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Logical Mentalism and the 'Weird Problem'

Date: 29 April 2024 (Monday)

Time: 16:45 – 18:15

Venue: LKK205 & Zoom Seminar



Here is the link to the seminar - https://lingnan.zoom.us/j/91923328554

Logical Realism (LR) is the orthodox doctrine that points of logical space are (metaphysical) possibilities for "the actual world": to wit, the totality of what is the case. A heterodox competitor, Logical Mentalism (LM), maintains instead that points of logical space are (phenomenological) possibilities for "one's present stance": to wit, the totality of what it is like. The 'trunk line' of the analytic tradition assigns logical-space points jobs in the analysis of consequence, modality, and content, while presupposing LR. If we instead presuppose LM, the opportunity arises to analyse mental and modal operators along closely analogous lines, as 'point-shifters' over a basis of not-fundamentally-modal or -mental propositions. Applied to a Chalmers-style conceivability argument, the analysis undermines not materialism, but instead the presumption that the involved mental sentence, Q, conveys a proposition aka "describes the world"; but if Q does not describe the world, there can be no Hard Problem of squaring that description with natural science. Instead, the analysis confronts one with the very Weird Problem, of what to make of its prediction that the precise characteristics of "one's present stance" are an absolutely inexplicable mystery.