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The Rise of China

Course Code:	POL4308
Course Title:	Selected Issues in Asian Pacific Governance
Recommended Year of Study:	3 or 4
No. of Credit/Term:	3
Mode of Tuition:	Lecture-Tutorial
Class Contact Hour:	3

Course Aims:

This course examines the rise of China as a world power and its impact on the international order. In particular, the course explores whether the rise of China has contributed to the end of the U.S.-led unipolar system and is moving the world toward a direction of multipolarity. Some specific topics include economic and military foundations of China's ascendance, China's foreign policy goals and strategies, and potential areas of conflicts between China and other countries. The course will also assess whether the rise of China will generate instability that is often associated with power shifts in the international system.

Learning Outcomes:

Students should be able to comprehend different aspects of the rise of China and its implications. Students should also learn why the rise of great powers has traditionally generated instability in the international system. Moreover, students should become familiar with the causes of rising conflicts between China and other countries.

Teaching Method:

This course consists of lectures, classroom discussions, tutorials, presentations, and research and writing.

Assessment:

The final grade of students will be determined by the following: attendance and participation 10%, tutorial 10%, research paper 30%, final exam 50%. The paper needs to be at least 12 pages long but no more than 15. The deadline will be December 4.

Readings:

There are no required textbooks. You can now access almost all the readings through the library's newly created "Course Readings@library" system.

Topics

Sept 4. Introduction

Sept 11. Why Does the Rise of New Powers Generate International Conflicts?

Graham Allison. 2015. "The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China Headed for War?" *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 24, at <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/>

Ronald L. Tammen and Douglas Lemke. 2000. *Power Transition: Strategies for the 21st Century*. Chapter 1.

Robert Gilpin. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*, Chapters 4 and 5.

Dale Copland. 2000. *The Origins of Major War*, the introduction chapter.

Sept 18. China's Grand Strategy for Its Ascendance

Avery Goldstein. 2001. "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice," *The China Quarterly*, December 2001.

Dingding Chen and Jianwei Wang. 2011. "Lying Low No More? China's New Thinking on *Tao Guang Yang Hui* Strategy," *China: An International Journal*, September.

Zheng Bijian. 2005. "China's 'Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 5 (September-October).

Orville Schell and John Delury. 2013. *Wealth and Power: China's Long March to The Twenty-First Century*.

Michael Pillsbury. 2015. *The Hundred Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower*.

Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, 2000. *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*, Chapter 4, at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1121.html.

Sept 25. The Rise of China's Material Power

Keith Fray. 2014. "China Leaps Forward, Overtaking the US as World's Biggest Economy," *The Financial Times*, October 8, at <http://blogs.ft.com/ftdata/2014/10/08/chinas-leap-forward-overtaking-the-us-as-worlds-biggest-economy/>

Wayne M. Morrison. 2015. "China's Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States," Congressional Research Service, October 21, at <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf>

Rand Corporation. 2015. *The US-China Military Scorecard: Forces Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996-2017*, at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR392/RAND_RR392.pdf

Julian Baird Gewirtz. 2019. "China's Long March to Technological Supremacy", *Foreign Affairs*, August 27, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-08-27/chinas-long-march-technological-supremacy>

Martin Jacques. 2009. *When China Rules of World*.

Oct 2. China's Power from a Critical Perspective

Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth. 2016. "The Once and Future Superpower: Why China Won't Overtake the United States," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower>

Susan Shirk. 2007. *China: Fragile Super Power*, Chapters 1-3.

John Cassidy. 2015. "China's Economic Slowdown: How Bad Is It?" *The New Yorker*, September 1, at <http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/chinas-economic-slowdown-how-bad-is-it>

Oct 9. China's Rise and Its Soft Power

Eleanor Albert. 2017. "China's Big Bet on Soft Power," Council on Foreign Relations, May 11, at <https://www.cfr.org/background/chinas-big-bet-soft-power>

Osamu Sayama. 2016. "China's Approach to Soft Power," Occasional Paper, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, March 1, 2016, at https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201603_op_chinas_soft_power.pdf

John Williamson. 2012. "Is the Beijing Consensus Now Dominant?" *Asia Policy*, January.

- Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang. 2006. "Sources and Limits of Chinese Soft Power," *Survival*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (May), at http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf.
- Joshua Cooper Ramo. 2004. *The Beijing Consensus*, at <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf>.
- Oct 16 Xi Jinping and the "China Dream"
- Zhang Feng. 2019. "The Xi Jinping Doctrine of China's International Relations," *Asian Policy*, Vol. 14, No. 3.
- Zhang Baohui. 2014. "Xi Jinping, Pragmatic Offensive Realism, and China's Rise," *Global Asia*, Volume 9, No. 2.
- The BBC. 2013. "What does Xi Jinping's China Dream Mean?" June 6, 2013, at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22726375>
- Liu Mingfu. 2015. *The China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-America Era*.
- Oct 23. China's Relations with the United States
- Zhao Minhao. 2019. "Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US-China Strategic Competition," *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 371-394.
- Kurt Campell and Jake Sullivan. 2019. "Competition Without Catastrophe: How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist with China," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 98, No. 5 (September/October)
- Qi Hao. 2015. "China Debates the New Type of Great Power Relations," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 349-370, at <https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/8/4/349/384319/China-Debates-the-New-Type-of-Great-Power>
- Li Cheng and Lucy Xu. 2014. "Chinese Enthusiasm and American Cynicism: The 'New Type of Great Power Relations,'" *China & US Focus*, December 14, at <http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinese-enthusiasm-and-american-cynicism-over-the-new-type-of-great-power-relations/>
- Kenneth Lieberthabl and Wang Jisi, 2012. *Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust*, the Brookings Institutions.
- Oct 30. China's Relations with Russia: A Potential Ally?
- Brian Fonseca and David J. Kramer. 2018. "A Strategic Alliance in the Making?" *The American Interest*, September 11, at <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/09/11/a-strategic-alliance-in-the-making/>

- Alexander Gabuev. 2015. A “Soft Alliance”? Russia-China Relations after the Ukraine Crisis, at [http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR126 -
A Soft Alliance Russia-China Relations After the Ukraine Crisis.pdf](http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR126_-_A_Soft_Alliance_Russia-China_Relations_After_the_Ukraine_Crisis.pdf)
- Dmitri Trenin. 2012. “True Partners? How Russia and China See Each Other,” at [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Trenin CER Eng.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Trenin_CER_Eng.pdf)
- Nov 6. China’s Relations with Japan and India: Rivals or Friends?
- Trissia Wijaya and Yuma Osaki. 2019. “Is This a True Thaw in Sino-Japanese Relations?” *The Diplomat*, February 16, at <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/is-this-a-true-thaw-in-sino-japanese-relations/>
- Mathieu Duchatel. 2018. “Japan-China Relations: Confrontation with a Smile,” European Council on Foreign Relations, October 1, at [https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_japan_china_relations_confrontation
with a smile](https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_japan_china_relations_confrontation_with_a_smile)
- Tatsushi Arai, Shihoko Goto, and Zheng Wang. 2016. *Clash of National Identities: China, Japan, and the East China Sea Territorial Dispute*, Wilson Center, at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/asia_china_seas_web.pdf
- Tomonori Sasaki. 2010. “China’s Threat Perception of Japan since the 1980s,” *The China Quarterly*, September.
- Jingdong Yuan. 2019. “After the Wuhan Summit: A Re-set in Sino-Indian Relations?” China-India Brief, No. 143, August 17-27, at <https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publications/details/china-india-brief-143>
- Kanti Bajpai. 2018. “Modi’s China Policy and the Road to Confrontation,” *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 91, No. 2, pp. 245-260.
- Nanti Bajpai. 2017. “Narendra Modi’s Pakistan and China Policy: Assertive Bilateral Diplomacy, Active Coalition Diplomacy,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 93, No. 3, pp. 69-91, at [https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/93/1/69/2731380/Narendra-
Modi-s-Pakistan-and-China-policy](https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/93/1/69/2731380/Narendra-Modi-s-Pakistan-and-China-policy)
- Lu Yang. 2016. *China-India Relations in the Contemporary World: Dynamics of National Identity and Interest* (Routledge 2016)
- Nov 13. China and Asia’s Hot Spots: North Korea, South China Sea, Taiwan Strait
- Howard French. 2014. “China’s Dangerous Game,” *The Atlantic*, December, at [http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinese-enthusiasm-and-
american-cynicism-over-the-new-type-of-great-power-relations/](http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/chinese-enthusiasm-and-american-cynicism-over-the-new-type-of-great-power-relations/)
- Li Mingjiang. 2012. “Chinese Debates of South China Sea Policy: Implications for

- Future Developments,” at <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP239.pdf>.
- Eleanor Albert. 2017. “The China-North Korea Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 5, at <https://www.cfr.org/background/china-north-korea-relationship>
- Bates Gill, 2011. “China’s North Korea Policy: Assessing Interests and Influence, at [http://www.usip.org/files/resources/China's North Korea Policy.pdf](http://www.usip.org/files/resources/China's_North_Korea_Policy.pdf).
- Baohui Zhang. 2011. “Taiwan’s New Grand Strategy,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, March.
- Nov 20. China’s Belt and Road Strategy
- Min Ye. 2019. “Fragmentation and Mobilization: Domestic Politics of the Belt and Road in China,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 28, Issue 119, at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2019.1580428>
- Weifeng Zhou and Mario Esteban. 2018. “Beyond Balancing: China’s Approach Toward the Belt and Road Initiative,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 27, No. 112, pp. 487-501.
- Scott Kennedy. 2015. “Building China’s One Belt, One Road,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, April 2, at <http://csis.org/publication/building-chinas-one-belt-one-road>
- David Dollar. 2015. “China’s Rise as a Regional and Global Power: The AIIB and the One Belt, One Road,” The Brookings Institution, at <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/07/china-regional-global-power-dollar>
- Nov 27. Is China Revising the World Order?
- Sten Rynning and Jens Ringsmose. 2008. “Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist: Reviving Classical Realism as an Approach to Understanding International Change,” *International Politics*, Vol. 45, pp. 19-39.
- Pradumna B Rana. 2015. “US-led vs. China-led Institutions: Need for New Bretton Woods,” RSIS Commentary, August 27, at <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cms/co15184-us-led-vs-china-led-institutions-need-for-new-bretton-woods/#.VegbtbTFGi4>
- Sebastian Heilmann and Moritz Rudolf, “China’s Shadow Foreign Policy: Parallel Structures Challenge the Established International Order,” Mercator Institute for

China Studies, October 2014, at

http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/templates/download/china-monitor/China_Monitor_No_18_en.pdf

Amitai Etzioni. 2011. "Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?" *International Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May).

Shaun Breslin, 2010. "China's Emerging Global Role: Dissatisfied Responsible Great Power," *Politics*, Vol. 30, Supplementary issue.

Important Notes:

- (1) Students are expected to spend a total of 9 hours (i.e. 3 hours of class contact and 6 hours of personal study) per week to achieve the course learning outcomes.
- (2) Students shall be aware of the University regulations about dishonest practice in course work, tests and examinations, and the possible consequences as stipulated in the Regulations Governing University Examinations. In particular, plagiarism, being a kind of dishonest practice, is "the presentation of another person's work without proper acknowledgement of the source, including exact phrases, or summarised ideas, or even footnotes/citations, whether protected by copyright or not, as the student's own work". Students are required to strictly follow university regulations governing academic integrity and honesty.
- (3) Students are required to submit writing assignment(s) using Turnitin.
- (4) To enhance students' understanding of plagiarism, a mini-course "Online Tutorial on Plagiarism Awareness" is available on <https://pla.ln.edu.hk/>.

Rubric for Presentation and classroom discussions

		Excellent (Above 85)	Good (Above 80)	Satisfactory (Above 70)	Fair (Above 60)	Poor (Below 60)
Presentation (10%)	Arguments/ points	Clear stance and able to offer many cogent arguments/points	Clear stance and able to offer some major cogent arguments/points	Ambiguous stance without addressing a few major arguments/points	Ambiguous stance leaving many major arguments/points untouched	No stance at all and/or only descriptions
	Structure	Logical flow and systematic arrangements	Logical but not structured very systematically	Logical but the structure is very weak	Little evidence of a logical structure	No logical structure at all
	Language	Speaking fluently and writing grammatically	Clear but a few grammar or pronunciation problems	Clear but with some grammar and pronunciation problems	Only occasionally clear	Unable to express clearly
	Answering critics (presenters)	Answer all major criticisms squarely and cogently + Rebut with comments	Answer some major criticisms squarely and cogently	Address some minor criticisms selectively	Referring to some minor criticisms but not able to answer them	Skip all criticisms
Discussion (Q/A) (10%)	Posing questions (discussants)	Questions with potentials of shaking the major foundations of the opponents' arguments + Offering own views in the questions	Questions touching on some key weaknesses of the opponents' arguments + Offering own views in the questions	Questions being too general to reveal weaknesses of the opponents' arguments + No own views offered in the questions	Questions only to invite opponents to re-state/clarify their arguments + Raising very few questions	Raising no questions
	Examples	Citing appropriate and enough examples and elaborate them well	Citing some important and relevant examples, but not much elaboration	Examples cited are relevant but not that important	Examples cited, but not relevant or important	No example offered
	Manner	Show a high level of confidence, humbleness and clear-mindedness	Show some confidence and ability to reason but occasionally disturbed by emotions	Not enough confidence; some evidence of escaping reason and passivity; occasionally disturbed by emotions	Little confidence; difficulty of offering reasons; evidence of showing passivity	Failure to exercise self-control/ discipline and not able to participate at all

Topic : _____

Tutorial Group No. : _____

Students' Name : _____

Rubric for Research Paper

	Excellence – Good (Above 80)	Satisfactory (Above 70)	Fair (Above 60)	Poor (Below 60)	GRADE
Content (30%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Most materials pertinent to the topic under research are well-covered and surveyed; ● Most facts, data, opinions, etc. are precisely reported, interpreted and discussed; ● Evidence of wide range of research; ● Well use of quotations and paraphrasing. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Some materials pertinent to the topic under research are covered and surveyed; ● Some facts, data, opinions, etc. are reported, interpreted and discussed; ● Evidence of reasonable research; ● Direct quotations may be overused or not used effectively. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Limited materials pertinent to the topic under research are covered and surveyed; ● Limited facts, data, opinions, etc. are reported, interpreted and discussed; ● Evidence of limited understanding of the topic; ● Generally over reliance on direct quotation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Little materials pertinent to the topic under research are covered and surveyed; ● Little facts, data, opinions, etc. are reported, interpreted and discussed; ● No evidence of understanding of the topic. 	
Analysis (40%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Well focused; ● Good use of the ideas stated in the core reading to support your argument; ● Offer own viewpoints frequently; ● Critically examine others' viewpoints; ● Use materials critically. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Reasonably focused but with some arguments unsupported and some material irrelevant; ● Ideas of the core reading are used effectively sometimes; ● Sometimes offer own viewpoints; ● Sometimes examine others' viewpoints critically; ● Use materials with some criticisms. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Limited focus with many unsupported arguments; ● Ideas of the core reading are often not used effectively; ● Seldom offer own viewpoints; ● Seldom examine others' viewpoints critically; ● Use materials with limited criticisms. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Almost no focus; ● Irrelevant sections; ● Almost no own viewpoints offered; ● Never examine others' viewpoints critically; ● Use materials without criticisms. 	
Coherence and Organization (20%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Good overall organization with introduction and conclusion; ● Main body is clearly divided into sections with suitable paraphrasing. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Organization generally clear but some limitations concerning the introduction, conclusion and paraphrasing; ● Reasonable use of subheadings and linking devices. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Organization unclear but some arguments are presented clearly; ● Subheadings used but not very reasonable sometimes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Lack of logical organization; ● No discernable introduction/ conclusion. 	
Language Fluency & Presentation (10%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Good/average command of academic language; ● Easy for readers to understand; ● Good presentation, in line with conventions, of cover page, reference list, appendices, page numbers and overall layout. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Some mistakes in use of language; ● Generally easy to read; ● Satisfactory. Some mistakes in referencing. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Limited communicative competence; ● Readers may struggle to understand some sections; ● Fair. Many mistakes in referencing. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Extremely limited communicative competence; ● Inability to use simple language accurately; ● Little or no attention paid to the presentation of cover page, reference list, and so on. 	
TOTAL					

Rubric for Final Exam

Criteria	Excellent	Proficient	Meets Minimum Standard	Below Standard	Marks
Comprehension of all the relevant concepts. (40%)	Demonstrates a deep insightful level of understanding (40)	Demonstrates a good surface level of understanding (30)	Demonstrates a fair level of surface understanding (20)	Demonstrates an inadequate level of understanding (0-10)	
Application of concepts to the problem posed. (40%)	Appropriate concepts are all applied correctly, (40)	Most concepts are applied correctly (30)	Some concepts are applied at too general a level or misapplied but the central ones are applied correctly and specifically (20)	Most concepts are applied at too general a level or misapplied (0-10)	
Extent to which ideas are expressed logically, accurately and clearly. (10%)	Expression of ideas is consistently accurate, logical and clear (10)	Expression of ideas is generally accurate, logical and clear with some minor lapses (8)	Expression of ideas is comprehensible but there are some major lapses (6)	Largely incomprehensible with some major inconsistencies and errors (0-3)	
Quality of English. (10%)	English is consistently excellent (10)	English is proficient with no major errors (8)	English conveys the essential meaning but contains a number of errors (6)	English is below acceptable university standard (0-3)	
Total Marks	Above 85	Above 80	Above 70	Above 60 and below	

Final Overall Grade

Mark Ranges	Grade
85 -100	A
80-84	A-
75-79	B+
70-74	B
65-69	B-
60-64	C+
55-59	C
50-54	C-
45-49	D+
40-44	D
0-39	F