Module 3 - Moral Permissibility of Risk Imposition

It is commonly believed that certain risky actions are too severe to be permitted. For instance, it is typically impermissible to expose someone to a certain level of ionizing radiation. However, most people also consider some actions to be permissible, even if they carry a possibility of serious harm. For example, driving very fast without exceeding the speed limit is usually acceptable, but it is typically impermissible to dump chemicals into an aquifer. The question arises: what explains this difference? How can we justify our moral thinking regarding the impermissibility of imposing risks on others? In this module, we will explore two possible answers to this question. We will discuss several topics including:

• The moral wrongness of risk imposition: risk as harm; 
• The moral wrongness of risk imposition: risk as rights violation against risk imposition
  • Risk Thesis
  • High Risk Thesis
  • Consent Thesis
  • Compensation Thesis 

To start out, we can see that we face a puzzle in explaining why it is wrong to impose risks on others. It is easy to comprehend why it is morally wrong to cause harm to others. However, it is less straightforward to understand why it is also wrong to impose mere risks of harm on others, particularly if no actual harm is caused. Some may argue that the mere belief of being at risk can have identifiable negative effects on well-being. But if the person subjected to the risk is unaware of the risk, are they harmed in any way? 

Finkelstein (2003) asserts that the act of imposing a risk is a form of harm and should, therefore, be given the same level of consideration as actual harm under the law. In Finkelstein's argument, harm is defined as an obstacle to a person's interests. He maintains that it is possible to impede a person's interests by exposing them to the possibility of harm. For instance, if I were to engage in a game of Russian Roulette with you without your consent, thereby giving you a one in six chance of death, I would be impeding your interests, even if you were to survive. This is what Finkelstein calls “risk harm”. However, if I were to offer you a ride in a car to your office, while the risks of a car crash are low, there is still a risk of injury or death; however, sufficiently low probabilities of harm may not be considered ‘risk harm’ so understood. 

John Oberdiek (2012) adopts an alternative approach to arguing for the moral wrongness of risking. Oberdiek shares Finkelstein's view that risk imposition is harm. However, he disagrees with the notion that the harms incurred are setbacks to interests or wellbeing. Instead, Oberdiek posits that risk imposition constitutes a setback to nonmaterial autonomy interests. In other words, imposing risk restricts the number of acceptable options available to the person subjected to the risk in the future.