Module 8 - Institutional Design and the Governance of Global Catastrophic Risks

When considering how best to tackle the threat posed by global catastrophic risks, there are two general strategies: (i) narrow interventions, and (ii) broad interventions. A narrow intervention is an intervention on the part of some governing body or political institution that is designed to address some specific risk or class of risks. In other words, narrow interventions are issue-specific. A broad intervention is an intervention on the part of some governing body or political institution designed to address global catastrophic risks in general. 

Of course, these should be viewed as general archetypes. In practice, an intervention may lie somewhere between these two extremes. Generally speaking, though, most existing proposals are either designed with specific risks (or classes of risks) in mind or they are more comprehensive, designed to improve our ability to manage catastrophic risk in general. So, in what follows we will use this distinction, bearing in mind that it is something of an over-simplification.

Here is a worry one might have with either sort of strategy. Part of the reason why we are collectively not able to adequately address the threat posed by global catastrophic risks is that existing political institutions and governments are commonly myopic in outlook, often focusing on short-term issues at the expense of long-term issues. Unfortunately, this myopia negatively impacts the governance of global catastrophic risks, since many (but not all) risks of global catastrophe will primarily affect future generations. Thus, these sorts of risks are likely to be neglected by existing governments and institutions. Call this the problem of political short-termism. 

Now, one might think that the sort of institutional myopia characteristic of political short-termism is precisely what the various narrow and broad interventions outlined previously are supposed to ameliorate. However, one common feature of each of both types of intervention is that they leave surrounding institutional structures largely unchanged. But if these surrounding structures are partly to blame for political short-termism to begin with, then simply establishing a new institution within a wider institutional background of entrenched myopia could very well be insufficient to address the relevant problems. For example, a Chief Risk officer is presumably supposed to focus on all manner of risks. But if they are incentivized to focus on the short-term, then some risks may be unduly neglected. Similar problems, of course, may arise for other interventions, whether narrow or broad. 

In the following video, we examine some of the causes of political short-termism, as well as some proposals for how to mitigate this problem.

Consider just two other closely related systemic issues which have received much attention in recent years from political philosophers and political scientists alike: rational ignorance and rational irrationality. Let’s begin with the former. A significant body of literature in political science and public polling shows that the typical voter possesses very little politically relevant information (Caplan, 2007; Somin, 2013; Brennan, 2016). This pervasive voter ignorance even extends to basic political facts such as the identity of their representatives, the structure and function of important political institutions, and much more (Gibbons, 2021). What explains such high levels of ignorance? Stemming from the seminal work of Anthony Downs in his classic An Economic Theory of Democracy, many scholars have argued that it is rational, with voters simply responding to incentives that are part and parcel of any large democracy. In short, the costs of acquiring political information are high while the benefits are low, given the incredibly low likelihood of casting a decisive vote. 

To be clear, such accounts of rational ignorance are not without their critics (Gibbons, 2023). But whether rational or not, widespread political ignorance has implications for the governance of global catastrophic risks. First, voters may inadvertently vote against their interests when choosing between different candidates. They may lack the information necessary to choose whichever representatives will best guard their interests and the interests of future generations. Second, political leaders are incentivized to respond to the preferences of voters. If voters have preferences that do not incentivize adequate engagement with global catastrophic risks (as seems likely, given widespread levels of political ignorance), political leaders will try to satisfy those preferences, at least some of the time. These mutually reinforcing outcomes will lead to the implementation of laws and policies that are not up to the task of competently addressing the threat of global catastrophe. Consider recent responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. In a sense, we are lucky we were not dealing with a much more severe virus, because the available evidence suggests that we would not have handled it well.